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EMPLOYMENT LAW
D. Paul Holdsworth *
INTRODUCTION
Against the backdrop of a year that saw the COVID-19 pandemic
alter the American workplace in an unprecedented way, the employment law landscape in Virginia also underwent a recent sea
change. Historically considered an employer-friendly state, the
General Assembly shifted away from tradition by enacting several
significant pieces of employee-friendly legislation, which will
surely have a long-lasting impact on Virginia employees, businesses, and Virginia’s economy at large.
This Article highlights these critical developments in Virginia
employment law.1 It does not provide an in-depth analysis of every
development but highlights the most significant changes affecting
employers and employees in the Commonwealth. Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of the added employee protections
from the federal legislation passed pursuant to the COVID-19 pandemic and discusses Virginia’s efforts in creating the nation’s first
COVID-19 workplace safety mandate. Part II briefly highlights
legislation enacted in 2019, which set the stage for the General Assembly’s activism in 2020, and then discusses in detail Virginia’s
new employment laws. Part III then addresses two recent landmark employment law decisions from the Supreme Court of the
United States of which employees and employers alike should be
aware.

*
Associate, Jackson Lewis P.C., Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 2015, University of Richmond School of Law; B.A., 2012, Brigham Young University.
1. This Article encompasses key developments between the latter half of 2019 and July
2020.
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I. EMPLOYMENT LEGISLATION OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC
A. Families First Coronavirus Response Act
In response to the rapid arrival and immediate impact of
COVID-19 on the American workforce, Congress enacted the Families First Coronavirus Response Act (“FFCRA”), which President
Trump signed into law on March 18, 2020, and which took effect
on April 1, 2020.2 The FFCRA’s primary protections for American
workers are two-fold: first, it requires eighty hours of paid sick
time for full-time employees who were unable to work for a variety
of reasons related to COVID-19, with part-time workers entitled to
the average number of hours the employee works over a two-week
period.3 Second, it expands the Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993 (“FMLA”) to provide paid leave to employees who are unable
to work in order to care for a child whose school or daycare center
had been closed because of COVID-19.4 Importantly, despite its intentionally broad reach (i.e., applying to all employers with 500 or
fewer employees), the FFCRA exempts certain categories of workers from these protections, namely healthcare providers and emergency responders.5 The FFCRA’s protections are set to expire on
December 31, 2020.6

2. Families First Coronavirus Response Act of 2020 (FFCRA), Pub. L. No. 116-127,
134 Stat. 178; see also Petra Cahill, Coronavirus: Crisis Moves from China to Europe, Trump
Signs Aid Bill, and Hospitals Prepare for Tough Decisions, NBC NEWS (Mar. 19, 2020),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/morning-briefingM/coronavirus-crisis-moves-china-europe
-trump-signs-aid-bill-hospitals-n1163636 [https://perma.cc/Q9YD-MFZA]; News Release:
U.S. Department of Labor Publishes Guidance Explaining Paid Sick Leave and Expanded
Family and Medical Leave Under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, WAGE &
HOUR DIVISION, U.S. DEP’T LAB. (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releas
es/whd/whd20200324 [https://perma.cc/UD9F-QX6Q].
3. FFCRA § 5102(a)–(b), 134 Stat. at 195–96.
4. Id. § 5102(a), 134 Stat. at 195–96.
5. Id. § 3105, 134 Stat. at 192. After the FFCRA’s enactment, the Department of Labor
(“DOL”) issued myriad clarifications, including as to the definition of “health care provider.”
Families First Coronavirus Response Act: Questions and Answers, WAGE & HOUR DIVISION,
U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/pandemic/ffcra-questions#55 [https://
perma.cc/WB7Y-WSAJ]. While the FFCRA mimics the definition of “health care provider”
in the FMLA and applies that definition where “health care provider” is being used to determine individuals whose advice to self-quarantine can be relied upon by employees seeking paid leave, the DOL’s guidance expands the definition of “health care provider” when it
is being used to identify which types of employees may be exempt from the FFCRA’s protections altogether. Id. In the latter scenario, the term “health care provider” extends to employees employed at educational institutions, medical schools, nursing facilities, retirement
facilities, facilities that perform medical laboratory testing, pharmacies, and other similar
entities, in addition to doctor’s offices, hospitals, medical clinics, and the like. Id.
6. FFCRA § 5109, 134 Stat. at 198.
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1. Emergency Paid Sick Leave Act
Encompassed within the FFCRA is the Emergency Paid Sick
Leave Act (“EPSLA”).7 The EPSLA provides up to eighty hours
(i.e., two weeks, or ten workdays) paid sick leave for any full-time
employee (or part-time employees on a pro-rated basis), irrespective of how long the employee has been employed,8 who is unable
to work due to one of the following circumstances:
(1) The employee is subject to quarantine or isolation under a local,
state, or federal order related to COVID-19;
(2) The employee has been advised by a healthcare provider to selfquarantine because of concerns associated with COVID-19;
(3) The employee is experiencing symptoms of COVID-19 and is
seeking a medical diagnosis of the same;
(4) The employee is caring for an individual who is subject to quarantine or isolation under a local, state, or federal order related to
COVID-19, or has been advised by a healthcare provider to self-quarantine;
(5) The employee is caring for a minor child whose school, daycare
center, or other childcare provider has closed or become unavailable
because of COVID-19; or
(6) The employee is experiencing a substantially similar condition,
as specified by the Department of Health and Human Services.9

If the reason for the employee’s need for paid sick leave falls
within scenarios (1), (2), or (3) above, the employer is required to
pay the employee at the higher of the employee’s average regular
rate, the federal minimum wage, or the local minimum wage,
capped at $511 per work day ($5110 over two weeks).10 By contrast,
if the employee’s need for paid sick leave falls within scenarios (4),
(5), or (6) above, the employer is only required to pay two-thirds of
the employee’s regular rate of pay, up to $200 per day ($2000 over
two weeks).11

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. § 5101, 134 Stat. at 195.
Id. § 5102(e)(1), 134 Stat. at 196.
Id. § 5102(a)(1)–(6), 134 Stat. at 195–96.
Id. § 5110(5)(A)(ii)(I), 134 Stat. at 200.
See id. § 5110(5)(A)(ii)(II), 134 Stat. at 200.
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Employers are prohibited from requiring an employee to exhaust
other paid leave prior to using the paid sick leave afforded by the
EPSLA.12 Importantly, the protections do not apply to employees
who are able to work remotely via telecommuting.13
2. Emergency Family and Medical Leave Expansion Act
In addition to the EPSLA, the FFCRA also includes protections
for employees under the Emergency Family and Medical Leave Expansion Act (“EFMLEA”).14 The EFMLEA allows eligible employees to take up to twelve weeks of leave due to the employee’s inability to work, including telework, in order to care for a minor child
whose school, daycare, or other childcare provider has closed or become unavailable as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.15 As is
the case under the FMLA, an employer is required to reinstate an
employee who takes leave under the EFMLEA to his or her position, or a reasonable equivalent.16
There are some significant differences between the EFMLEA
and the FMLA, however. For example, whereas the FMLA requires
an employee to have been employed by his or her employer for at
least twelve months (and 1250 hours of service) before the employee can take protected leave, the EMFLEA only requires the
employee to have been employed for thirty days in order to take
protected leave.17 Additionally, the EMFLEA applies to all employers with fewer than 500 employees whereas the FMLA applies to
employers with fifty or more employees.18

12. Id. § 5102(e)(2), 134 Stat. at 196. Employers may also not require that the employee
find a replacement employee to cover the hours which the employee will miss. Id. § 5102(d),
134 Stat. at 196.
13. Id. § 5102(a), 134 Stat. at 195.
14. Id. § 3101, 134 Stat. at 189.
15. Id. sec. 3102(b), § 110, 134 Stat. at 189.
16. Id. sec. 3102(b), § 110(d), 134 Stat. at 191. For employers with fewer than twentyfive employees, an employer is not required to reinstate an employee who takes leave under
the EFMLEA if (i) the employee’s position no longer exists because of “economic conditions
or other changes in operating conditions” as a result of COVID-19; (ii) the employer has
made a reasonable effort to restore the employee to an equivalent position; and (iii) if, after
the employer’s reasonable efforts no reinstatement can be made, the employer makes reasonable efforts to contact the employee if an equivalent position becomes available within
one year after the end of the public health emergency or the end of the employee’s twelveweek leave, whichever is earlier. Id. sec. 3102(b), § 110(d)(1)–(3), 134 Stat. at 191.
17. Id. sec. 3102(b), § 110(a)(1)(A), 134 Stat. at 189.
18. Id. sec. 3102(b), § 110(a)(1)(B), 134 Stat. at 189. As with the EPSLA, however, an
employer with fifty or fewer employees may be exempt if they can establish that providing
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Under the EMFLEA, the first ten days of leave is unpaid; however, an employee can elect to take paid leave under the EPLSA or
can use any other accrued paid leave during this ten-day period.19
After the initial ten-day period, an employer is required to remunerate the employee at a rate of two-thirds his or her regular rate
of pay, up to $200 per day but may not exceed a total of $10,000.20
B. CARES Act Overview
On April 24, 2020, President Trump also signed the Coronavirus
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”), in order to
support businesses and employees impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic.21 Although a deep dive into the CARES Act is beyond the
scope of this update, the CARES Act contains several key financial
and other protections for employers due to the expected impact of
COVID-19 on the United States economy. A cursory overview of
some of these protections follows:
1. Paycheck Protection Program
Allows eligible employers with fewer than 500 employees to obtain a loan for the purpose of paying overhead, such as payroll,
employee benefits, rent, utilities, etc., subject to certain restrictions and requirements (including a good-faith certification
that the funds are necessary to support ongoing operations and will
be used to retain and maintain workers or the employer’s mortgage, lease, or utility payments).22

EFMLEA leave would “jeopardize the viability of the business as a going concern.” Id. sec.
3102(b), § 110(a)(3)(B), 134 Stat. at 190.
19. Id. sec. 3102(b), § 110(b)(1)(A)–(B), 134 Stat. at 190.
20. Id. sec. 3102(b), § 110(b)(2)(A)–(B), 134 Stat. at 190–91.
21. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act of 2020 (CARES Act), Pub. L.
No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281; see also Lauren Egan, Trump Signs Coronavirus Aid Bill as
Tensions Rise over Next One, NBC NEWS (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/
white-house/trump-expected-sign-interim-coronavirus-bill-tensions-rise-over-next-n1191
71111 [https://perma.cc/7EBK-HGQK].
22. CARES Act § 1102, 134 Stat. at 286.
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2. Loan Forgiveness Program
Allows employers who receive a loan under section 1102 to apply
to have a portion of their paycheck protection loan forgiven based
on certain reduction requirements and thresholds.23
3. Emergency Grants
Authorizes the Small Business Administration to provide emergency grants of $10,000 to qualifying employers for the purposes of
providing paid sick leave to employees who are unable to work because of COVID-19, maintaining payroll, paying mortgage or rent,
or other allowable purposes.24
4. Enhancement of Unemployment Insurance Protections
(Sections 2101–2116 of the CARES Act)
Extends unemployment insurance by thirteen weeks and provides a four-month enhancement of benefits, including an additional $600 per week benefit in addition to the employee’s state’s
benefit amount.25
Expands the scope of eligible recipients by making unemployment benefits available to those with limited work history or who
have exhausted their state unemployment benefits.26
Individuals who are unable to work remotely and who are otherwise unemployed or partially unemployed because of COVID-19
are covered.27
5. Retirement Account Access Provisions
Waives the IRS’s 10% excise tax on early distribution from retirement plans if the distribution is for an individual who is diagnosed with COVID-19, whose spouse or dependent is diagnosed

23. Id. § 1106, 134 Stat. at 297.
24. Id. § 1110, 134 Stat. at 306.
25. Id. §§ 2102(c)(2), 2104(e), 2107(a)–(b), 134 Stat. at 315, 319, 323–25.
26. Id. § 2102(a)(3), 134 Stat. at 313.
27. Id.
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with COVID-19, or who is furloughed, laid off, or unable to work
due to COVID-19.28
6. Relaxed Tax Provisions (Sections 2301–2302, 3607–3608
of the CARES Act)
Allows employers to claim a tax credit equal to 50% of “qualified
wages” paid to employees from March 13, 2020, to December 31,
2020, if the employer’s operations are fully or partially suspended
due to COVID-19 or if the employer’s 2020 gross receipts are less
than 50% of the gross receipts for the same calendar quarter in
2019.29
Permits all employers, regardless of the level of COVID-19’s impact, to delay payment of 2020 Social Security taxes (with 50% payable by December 31, 2021, and the remaining 50% payable by December 31, 2022).30
C. Survey of COVID-19-Related Issues Affecting or Soon-to-beAffecting Virginia Employers
The lasting effect of COVID-19 on the American workplace remains to be seen. As local, state, and federal leaders grapple with
trying to reopen businesses and the economy while preventing additional spread or subsequent waves or outbreaks of positive
COVD-19 cases, employers nationwide are left to navigate a new
and challenging reality fraught with unique and novel questions.31
In the aftermath of the pandemic, litigation related to COVID-19
has and will continue to increase.32 The following is a non-exhaustive list of areas in which employment litigation may increase because of COVID-19:
(1) Discrimination and retaliation claims arising from a given
employee’s selection for layoff or furlough;

28. Id. § 2202(a), 134 Stat. at 340.
29. Id. § 2301, 134 Stat. at 347.
30. Id. § 2302, 134 Stat. at 351.
31. COVID-19 Implications for Business, MCKINSEY & CO. (July 23, 2020), https://www.
mckinsey.com/business-functions/risk/our-insights/covid-19-implications-for-business
[https://perma.cc/3WGX-D3MK].
32. Christopher R. Dyess, The Coming Tsunami of Employment-Related COVID-19 Litigation, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/04/21/thecoming-tsunami-of-employment-related-covid-19-litigation [https://perma.cc/3VG6-FW2N].
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(2) Discrimination and retaliation claims arising from a failure
to hire or rehire due to protected class (such as age, where the employee or applicant is at a higher risk for adverse COVID-19 symptoms);
(3) Disparate impact claims in disproportionally selecting
higher-risk employees for layoff or furlough;
(4) Breach of contract claims for rescinding offers of employment
due to an employer’s loss of profitability;
(5) Failure to accommodate employees who are at higher risk
for adverse COVID-19 symptoms;
(6) Failure to accommodate telecommuting as a reasonable accommodation;
(7) Increased claims based on persons being regarded as disabled or having COVID-19;
(8) Alleged violations of the paid sick leave and emergency medical leave provisions of the FFCRA;
(9) Workplace safety claims relating to an employer’s failure to
furnish a safe workplace;
(10) Workplace safety whistleblower and retaliation claims arising from an employee’s complaint about an unsafe workplace; and
(11) Negligence or other personal injury claims related to potential or actual COVID-19 exposure while on the job.
D. Executive Order No. 63: Virginia’s Workplace Safety Mandate
In response to an executive order from Governor Ralph
Northam, Virginia became the first state to adopt an emergency
workplace safety standard addressing occupational health and
safety concerns raised by COVID-19.33 Governor Northam entered
Executive Order 63 in May, directing the Virginia Department of
Labor and Industry’s Safety and Health Codes Board (“DOLI
Board”) to create an enforceable regulation to combat COVID-19.34

33. Vin Gurrier, Va. Adopts Nation’s First COVID-19 Workplace Safety Mandate, LAW
360 (July 15, 2020), https://www.law360.com/employment/articles/1292428 [https://perma.
cc/6XA3-M3ZW].
34. Id.
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On July 15, 2020, the DOLI Board voted to approve the new infectious disease prevention rule.35
Under the mandate, Virginia businesses must provide workers
with personal protective equipment and adhere to strict guidelines
for sanitizing the workplace, enforcing social distancing, and establishing infectious disease response plans.36 Moreover, if an employee tests positive for COVID-19, the employer is required to inform all employees within twenty-four hours and direct all workers
who are suspected to have had contact with the infected employee
to stay home for ten days or until he or she tests negative for
COVID-19 twice in a row.37
Following the DOLI Board’s vote to approve the rule, Governor
Northam and others praised Virginia’s efforts in “creating the nation’s first enforceable workplace safety requirements,” which was
necessary due to the “absence of federal guidelines” and “[i]n the
face of federal inaction”—referring presumably to the U.S. Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s
issuance of non-binding workplace safety guidance but refusal to
set a federal nationwide standard.38 Governor Northam remarked
that
[w]orkers should not have to sacrifice their health and safety to earn
a living, especially during an ongoing global pandemic. . . . Keeping
Virginians safe at work is not only a critical part of stopping the
spread of this virus, it’s key to our economic recovery and it’s the right
thing to do.39

II. LEGISLATIVE UPDATES: A CHANGING LANDSCAPE IN VIRGINIA
A. Prequel 2019 Legislation
Prior to 2020’s sweeping changes in Virginia employment law,
the General Assembly foreshadowed its intent to bolster protections for employees through a couple of key precursor pieces of legislation in 2019, which are discussed in turn.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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1. Personnel Records
Although an employee’s personnel file has historically been
viewed as solely within the purview of the employer,40 the General
Assembly passed Senate Bill 1724, which amended Virginia Code
section 8.01-413, to afford employees greater rights to access their
personnel records.41
Where Virginia Code section 8.01-413.1 previously concerned
the admissibility of wage and salary records in litigation, the
amendment—which took effect July 1, 2019—requires all employers to provide current and former employees with copies of certain
employment records within thirty days of his or her written request.42 The employee is not entitled to every record in the employer’s possession, but is entitled to records showing the employee’s (1) dates of employment; (2) wages or salary; (3) job
description and title; and (4) injuries sustained in the course of employment.43 As amended, Virginia Code section 8.01-413.1(B)
reads:
Every employer shall, upon receipt of a written request from a current
or former employee or employee’s attorney, furnish a copy of all records or papers retained by the employer in any format, reflecting (i)
the employee’s dates of employment with the employer; (ii) the employee’s wages or salary during the employment; (iii) the employee’s
job description and job title during the employment; and (iv) any injuries sustained by the employee during the course of the employment
with the employer.44

The employer must provide these documents, subject to a reasonable reimbursement of costs, within thirty days of the employee’s request; however, if the employer is unable to provide such
records within the thirty-day timeline, it may notify the employee
or his attorney and explain the reason for the delay.45 If the employer does so, the statute allows them thirty additional days to
respond.46 If, after the additional thirty days, the employer fails to
40. Diane Cadrain, Setting the Records Straight, HR MAG. (June 1, 2007), https://www.
shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-magazine/pages/0607cadrain.aspx [https://perma.cc/4TQH-24
QA].
41. Act of Mar. 21, 2019, ch. 733, 2019 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-413.1 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-413.1(A)–(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
43. See id. § 8.01-413.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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produce the requested documents, the employee or his attorney
may seek the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and recourse in
the circuit court.47
The General Assembly did provide employers with a narrow exception to this requirement. Employers are not required to furnish
the requested documents to an employee if those documents contain a written statement from the employee’s treating physician or
clinical psychologist stating that
the furnishing to or review by the employee of such records or papers
would be reasonably likely to endanger the life or physical safety of
the employee or another person, or that such records or papers make
reference to a person, other than a health care provider, and the access
requested would be reasonably likely to cause substantial harm to
such referenced person.48

Importantly, Virginia Code section 8.01-413.1 does not impose
an obligation on employers to keep particular records, or to keep
personnel files for a particular length of time.
2. Nondisclosure Agreements and Sexual Assault
On February 22, 2019, the General Assembly passed House Bill
1820 to create Virginia Code section 40.1-28.01, which prohibits
employers from requiring employees or applicants to sign a “nondisclosure or confidentiality agreement that has the purpose or effect of concealing the details relating to a claim of sexual assault.”49
The law voids and renders unenforceable any such agreement.50
The term “sexual assault” is not technically defined in the statute,
but Virginia Code section 40.1-28.01 otherwise makes clear by reference to other statutes that it applies to claims arising under Virginia’s laws on rape (Virginia Code section 18.2-61), forcible sodomy (Virginia Code section 18.2-67.1), aggravated sexual battery
(Virginia Code section 18.2-67.3), and sexual battery (Virginia
Code section 18.2-67.4).51 Importantly, insofar as the new law contemplates the execution of nondisclosure or confidentiality agree-

47. See id. § 8.01-413.1(C)–(D) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
48. Id. § 8.01-413.1(E) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
49. Act of Feb. 22, 2019, ch. 131, 2019 Va. Acts 282, 282 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 40.1-28.01(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.01(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
51. Id.
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ments “as a condition of employment,” it does not impact the inclusion of nondisclosure or confidentiality provisions in severance or
settlement agreements.52
3. Written Pay Statements
The General Assembly also amended Virginia Code section 40.129 to impose additional obligations to employers in the provision of
pay statements to employees.
Prior to January 1, 2020—the amendment’s effective date—employers were only required to furnish paystubs showing an employee’s gross pay and applicable deductions, and only at the employee’s request.53 As amended, employers are now required to
provide a written statement, by paystub or online accounting, of an
employee’s earnings that states or shows the following: (1) the employer’s name and address; (2) the number of hours the employee
worked during the pay period; (3) the employee’s rate of pay; (4)
the employee’s gross wages for the pay period; and (5) the amount
and purpose of any deductions from the employee’s pay.54 Under
the amendment, this information must be provided regardless of
any specific request from the employee.55
B. 2020 Legislation
1. Virginia Values Act and Changes to the Virginia Human
Rights Act
Of the several new pieces of employment legislation signed into
law by Governor Northam in 2020, the Virginia Values Act (Senate
Bill 868) is perhaps the most notable, as it significantly broadens
the scope of the Virginia Human Rights Act (“VHRA”) by expanding protections for additional classes of persons as well as providing additional remedies beyond what is provided under federal
anti-discrimination laws.56

52. See id. § 40.1-28.01(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
53. Act of Apr. 3, 2019, ch. 845, 2019 Va. Acts 1989, 1990 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 40.1-29(C) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
54. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-29(C) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
55. Ch. 845, 2019 Va. Acts at 1990.
56. Act of Apr. 11, 2020, ch. 1140, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 2.2-3900 to -3908 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
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Prior to the Virginia Values Act, which took effect July 1, 2020,
the VHRA only applied to a narrow category of employers—those
with more than five and fewer than fifteen employees (or, fewer
than twenty employees with respect to age).57 And it only prohibited the discharge of an employee on the basis of the following characteristics: (i) race, (ii) color, (iii) religion, (iv) national origin, (v)
sex, (vi) pregnancy, and (vii) childbirth or related medical conditions, including lactation.58 The only remedies that were available
to affected employees were a maximum twelve months of backpay
and reasonable attorneys’ fees (not to exceed 25% of the backpay
award).59 The VHRA prohibited the recovery of any other compensatory or punitive damages as well as prohibited reinstatement of
the employee.60
To summarize, prior to the Virginia Values Act, the VHRA only
applied to small employers not covered by Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and other similar federal anti-discrimination laws, only protected against discrimination which resulted in an employee’s discharge, and only permitted modest damages.61
The Virginia Values Act expands the VHRA in the following
ways: it (i) broadens employer coverage; (ii) affords protections to
additional classes; (iii) prohibits more than just an employee’s unlawful discharge; (iv) augments the available remedies for affected
employees; and (v) requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations for pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions, including lactation.62 Each of these are discussed in turn.
a. Broadened Employer Coverage
As amended, the VHRA now covers all employers with fifteen or
more employees, and not just those employers with between six
and fourteen employees.63 Moreover, the VHRA now extends to

57. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3903(B) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text.
62. Act of Apr. 11, 2020, ch. 1140, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 2.2-2901.1, -3900, -3905 to -3908 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
63. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3905(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020); id. § 2.2-3903(B) (Repl. Vol. 2017).
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other entities not previously covered, including employment agencies, labor organizations, state agencies (and other similar statebased entities), and school boards.64
b. Additional Classes Protected
On March 4, 2020, shortly before the passing of the Virginia Values Act, Governor Northam signed an amendment to the definition
of “race” under the VHRA to include traits historically associated
with race, such as hairstyles.65 In so doing, Virginia became just
the fourth state (behind California, New Jersey, and New York) to
make discrimination based on hairstyles unlawful.66 As amended,
the VHRA now provides that “[t]he terms ‘because of race’ or ‘on
the basis of race’ or terms of similar import when used in reference
to discrimination . . . include because of or on the basis of traits
historically associated with race, including hair texture, hair type,
and protective hairstyles such as braids, locks, and twists.”67 Importantly, while the amendment expressly identifies hairstyles,
the amendment applies to any other traits historically associated
with race.
A little more than one month following the augmented definition
of race for purposes of the VHRA, Governor Northam signed an
amendment prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis
of sexual orientation and gender identity.68 “Sexual orientation” is
defined in the statute as “a person’s actual or perceived heterosexuality, bisexuality, or homosexuality.”69 “Gender identity” is defined in the statute to mean “the gender-related identity, appearance, or other gender-related characteristics of an individual, with
or without regard to the individual’s designated sex at birth.”70

64. Id. §§ 2.2-2901.1(B), -3905(B), 15.2-1500.1(B), 22.1-295.2(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
The protections afforded under the VHRA also apply to places of public accommodation. See
id. § 2.2-3904(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
65. Act of Mar. 3, 2020, ch. 107, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 2.2-3901(D) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
66. Guy Brenner & Caroline Guensberg, Virginia Becomes the Fourth State to Ban Discrimination on the Basis of Hairstyles, PROSKAUER ROSE LLP: LAW AND THE WORKPLACE
(Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.lawandtheworkplace.com/2020/03/virginia-becomes-the-fourthstate-to-ban-discrimination-on-the-basis-of-hairstyles/ [https://perma.cc/GD9A-BS2H].
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3901(D) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
68. Act of Apr. 11, 2020, ch. 1140, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 2.2-3905(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
69. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3901(C) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
70. Id. § 2.2-3901(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
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Moreover, while the VHRA already prohibited discrimination
based on pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions, it did
not previously specify lactation as being covered within those categories. As amended by the Virginia Values Act, the VHRA now
includes lactation within the definition of “on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions.”71 “Lactation” is
defined as “a condition that may result in the feeding of a child
directly from the breast or the expressing of milk from the
breast.”72
Lastly, the VHRA prohibits discrimination based on veteran status, which had not previously been prohibited under Virginia law
despite having long been protected under federal law.73
c. Expands the Possible Bases for Relief
As mentioned, before the Virginia Values Act, the VHRA did not
apply to discrimination that did not result in an employee’s discharge. Similar to its federal counterpart,74 the VHRA now prohibits an employer from engaging in an “unlawful employment practice,” which includes “fail[ing] or refus[ing] to hire, discharg[ing],
or otherwise discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect
to such individual’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment” because of a protected characteristic.75
Employers with between six and fourteen employees remain
subject only to claims of unlawful discharge, as before the Virginia
Values Act.76
d. Expands the Available Remedies
The Virginia Values Act also amends the VHRA to include enforcement mechanisms and remedies previously unrecognized. For
example, the VHRA now affords employees with a private right of
action against all covered employers with fifteen or more employees (or twenty or more employees if the discrimination is based on
71. Act of Apr. 11, 2020, ch. 1139, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 2.2-3901(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3901(E) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
73. Id. § 2.2-3905(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
75. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3905(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
76. See id. § 2.2-3905(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
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age) for an employer’s “unlawful employment practice.”77 And
where employees were previously limited to twelve months’ backpay and a limited attorneys’ fees award, the VHRA expands the
available damages to include an unlimited amount of compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and
costs, in addition to temporary and permanent injunctive relief.78
The unlimited amount of compensatory damages is significant because it now provides employees with greater protection than exists under federal law, as claims under Title VII and other federal
laws are subject to compensatory damages caps which cannot exceed $300,000.79
Importantly, like its federal counterpart,80 the VHRA now requires an aggrieved employee to first file a charge of discrimination
with the Virginia Division of Human Rights or Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (and cross-file with the Virginia Division
of Human Rights) before the employee can bring an action in
court.81 Upon receipt of notice that the charge will be dismissed,
the employee can file a lawsuit in general district court (subject to
jurisdictional limits) or circuit court.82
e. Requires Employers to Provide Reasonable Accommodations
to Certain Classes
In addition to including lactation in the definition of “pregnancy,
childbirth or related medical conditions,” the Virginia Values Act
also created a new statutory obligation for employers with more
than five employees to provide reasonable accommodations to both
applicants and employees who are experiencing pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions, unless doing so would cause an
undue hardship.83
“Reasonable accommodation” under the amendment is defined
to include

77. Act of Apr. 11, 2020, ch. 1140, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 2.2-3905(A), -3907(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
78. Id. at __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3906(B)–(C) (Cum. Supp.
2020)).
79. Id. at __; 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b).
80. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3907 (Cum. Supp. 2020).
82. Id. § 2.2-3907(B), (F)–(G) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
83. Id. § 2.2-3909 (Cum. Supp. 2020).
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more frequent or longer bathroom breaks, breaks to express breast
milk, access to a private location other than a bathroom for the expression of breast milk, access to a private location other than a bathroom for the expression of breast milk, acquisition or modification of
equipment or access or modification of employee seating, a temporary
transfer to a less strenuous or hazardous position, assistance with
manual labor, job restructuring, a modified work schedule, light duty
assignments, and leave to recover from childbirth.84

As under the Americans with Disabilities Act,85 the VHRA requires employers and employees to engage in an “interactive process” to determine an appropriate and reasonable accommodation
and similarly prohibits retaliation against employees who request
a reasonable accommodation.86
The new law also expressly creates a private right of action for
an aggrieved employee to challenge an employer’s failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, failure to hire, discharge, or
other discrimination.87 Importantly, the General Assembly did not
make this private right of action subject to the employee first filing
a charge of discrimination.88 Under the law, an employee has two
years from the date of the last adverse action to bring an action in
general district or circuit court (or within ninety days if the employee filed a charge of discrimination).89
Lastly, the VHRA requires employers to post information on the
prohibition against discrimination and the right to a reasonable
accommodation in a conspicuous location and to include the same
in their employee handbooks.90 In addition to new employees, the
law also requires employers to provide this information to all employees who provide notification of an impending pregnancy within
ten days.91

84.
85.
12213).
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101–
VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3909(C) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Id. § 2.2-3909(E) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
See id.
Id.
Id. § 2.2-3909(D) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Id.
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2. Employee Misclassification
In 2020, Virginia also joined a growing number of states that
enacted legislation specifically designed to curb the practice of employers classifying workers as independent contractors instead of
employees.92
Governor Northam’s directed efforts to address employee misclassification began in August 2018 when he reconstituted a taskforce, the Inter-Agency Taskforce on Worker Misclassification and
Payroll Fraud (“Taskforce”), specifically charged with providing
recommendations on how to “measure and combat misclassification in Virginia.”93 The Taskforce included representatives from
several state agencies, including the Virginia Employment Commission, the Department of Labor and Industry, the Department
of Professional and Occupational Regulation, and the Office of the
Attorney General.94
In its November 22, 2019, report, the Taskforce observed that
[t]he misclassification of actual employees as ‘independent contractors’ creates a competitive disadvantage for Virginia businesses that
follow the law, deprives the Commonwealth of millions of dollars in
tax revenues necessary to supply services to Virginia’s citizens, and
prevents workers from receiving protections and benefits to which
they are legally entitled.95

Citing to a similar report from 2012, the Taskforce approximated
that “up to one-third of audited employers in certain industries
misclassify employees,” which allows those employers to lower
their overhead by as much as 40% by avoiding obligations to purchase workers’ compensation insurance, to pay unemployment and
insurance taxes, or to comply with minimum wage and overtime
obligations.96 The cited 2012 report observed that misclassification
affects as many as 214,000 workers and further estimated that
92. INTER-AGENCY TASKFORCE ON MISCLASSIFICATION & PAYROLL FRAUD, REPORT FOR
EXECUTIVE ORDER THIRTY-EIGHT 8 (2019), https://www.governor.virginia.gov/media/gover
norvirginiagov/governor-of-virginia/pdf/Final_Worker-Misclassification-Report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/GNL9-ARRG]. Other states that have enacted penalties for misclassified workers
include: Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Id.
93. Id. at 5.
94. Id. at 6, 28–35.
95. Id. at 3.
96. Id.
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worker misclassification lowered Virginia’s annual state income
tax revenue by as much as $28 million.97
The Taskforce then offered eleven recommendations aimed at
curbing employee misclassification, including (i) assessing greater
penalties to dissuade worker misclassification; (ii) eliminating employers’ ability to claim good faith defenses (such as through the
receipt of advice and counsel on its business model); (iii) creating a
private cause of action permitting misclassified workers to sue for
wages, taxes, lost benefits, etc.; (iv) providing whistleblower protections to those who report suspected misclassification; and (v)
making misclassification a sanctionable offense for Board of Contractors-licensed businesses.98
In response to the Taskforce’s efforts, the General Assembly enacted Virginia Code section 40.1-28.7:7. This new law, which took
effect July 1, 2020, accomplishes two primary objectives. First, it
establishes a presumption that an individual providing services for
remuneration is an employee, not an independent contractor.99
Second, it creates a private right of action for workers to challenge
and enforce misclassification.100 In other words, an aggrieved
worker may now bring a civil action for damages against their employer if the employer had knowledge of the individual’s misclassification.101 If that worker successfully challenges his or her misclassification, he or she is entitled to lost wages, salary,
employment benefits (including resulting expenses that would
have otherwise been covered by insurance), reasonable attorneys’
fees, and costs.102
In addition to the presumption in favor of employee status and
the creation of a private right of action to challenge one’s employee
classification, the General Assembly also enacted a separate statute, Virginia Code section 40.1-33.1 (also effective July 1, 2020),
prohibiting employers from retaliating against workers who report
suspected misclassification.103 Virginia Code section 40.1-33.1, as
enacted, provides in pertinent part:

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 6–7.
VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.7:7(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Id. § 40.1-28.7:7(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 40.1-33.1 (Cum. Supp. 2020).
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A. An employer shall not discharge, discipline, threaten, discriminate
against, or penalize an employee or independent contractor, or take
other retaliatory action regarding an employee or independent contractor’s compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment, because the employee or independent contractor:
1. Has reported or plans to report to an appropriate authority
that an employer, or any officer or agent of the employer, has
failed to properly classify an individual as an employee and
failed to pay required benefits or other contributions; or
2. Is requested or subpoenaed by an appropriate authority to
participate in an investigation, hearing, or inquiry by an appropriate authority or in a court action.104

The statute also provides that the prohibition only applies to
those employees who report suspected worker misclassification “in
good faith and upon a reasonable belief that the information is accurate.”105 If the employee recklessly discloses information about
suspected worker misclassification or otherwise “knew or should
have known” that the information was “false, confidential by law,
or malicious,” that employee is not entitled to the protections of
Virginia Code section 40.1-33.1(A).106
Notably, Virginia Code section 40.1-33.1 provides an administrative enforcement remedy to employees who have suffered perceived retaliation for reporting suspected worker misclassification.107 Under Virginia Code section 40.1-33.1(C), “[a]ny employee
who is discharged, disciplined, threatened, discriminated against,
or penalized in a manner prohibited by this section may file a complaint with the Commissioner [of the Virginia Department of Labor
and Industry].”108 Thereafter, the Commissioner may proceed on
the employee’s behalf, to seek reinstatement of the employee and
recovery of the employee’s lost wages, or other potentially appropriate remedies.109 In addition, the General Assembly granted the
Commissioner the authority to assess “a civil penalty not to exceed
the amount of the employee’s wages that are lost” to employers

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id. § 40.1-33.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
See id.
See id. § 40.1-33.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
Id.
Id.
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found to have retaliated against an employee that reported suspected worker misclassification.110
Lastly, the General Assembly also passed legislation, Virginia
Code section 58.1-1900 to -1905, granting additional authority to
the Virginia Department of Taxation to investigate and assess tax
penalties for worker misclassification. Under Virginia Code section
58.1-1901,
[a]ny employer, or any officer or agent of the employer, that fails to
properly classify an individual as an employee . . . and fails to pay
taxes, benefits, or other contributions required to be paid with respect
to an employee shall, upon notice by the Department to the affected
party, be subject to a civil penalty of up to $1,000 per misclassified
individual for a first offense, up to $2,500 per misclassified individual
for a second offense, and up to $5,000 per misclassified individual for
a third or subsequent offense.111

Other severe consequences are at stake as well for employers
who misclassify their employees. Virginia Code section 58.1-1902
requires that the Virginia Department of Taxation provide notice
of the employer’s misclassifications to “all public bodies and covered institutions of the name of the employer” and prohibits those
public bodies and covered institutions from awarding any contract
to that employer for a period of up to one year from the date of the
notice of a second offense and up to three years from the date of the
notice of a third or subsequent offense.112 Importantly, the new law
also prohibits employers from “requir[ing] or request[ing] that an
individual enter into an agreement [such as an independent contractor agreement] or sign a document that results in the misclassification of the individual as an independent contractor or otherwise does not accurately reflect the relationship with the employer”
and likewise prohibits retaliation against any individual who exercises rights protected under the new law.113
3. Additional Whistleblower Protections
The General Assembly also enacted a new comprehensive whistleblower protection law, Virginia Code section 40.1-27.3 (House

110. Id. § 40.1-33.1(D) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
111. Id. § 58.1-1901 (Cum. Supp. 2020).
112. Id. § 50.1-1902 (Cum. Supp. 2020).
113. Id. §§ 58.1-1903 to -1904 (Cum. Supp. 2020).
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Bill 798)—the first of its kind in Virginia—which took effect July
1, 2020.
Prior to the General Assembly’s enactment of House Bill 798,
there was virtually no employment protection for whistleblowers
in the private sector. Indeed, Virginia has long adhered to the doctrine of employment at will, which allows an employee to leave his
or her employment at any time and for any reason and simultaneously permits an employer to terminate an employee at any time
and for any reason.114
The Supreme Court of Virginia first recognized an exception to
the at-will doctrine in Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville,115 permitting an action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.116 However, since Bowman, Virginia courts have exercised significant caution in permitting claims of wrongful termination and
have interpreted Bowman narrowly.117 In fact, as the Supreme
Court of Virginia recently observed in Francis v. National Accrediting Commission of Career Arts & Sciences, Inc., Virginia courts
have only recognized three narrow circumstances in which an employee may sue his or her employer for a wrongful termination in
violation of public policy: (1) when the employer violated an employee’s exercise of a statutorily created right; (2) when the employer’s actions against the employee violate a public policy that is
explicitly expressed in a Virginia statute and the employee was a
member of the class of persons the public policy was designed to
protect; and (3) the employee refuses to engage in a criminal act.118
As enacted, Virginia Code section 40.1-27.3 reinforces the right
of employees to challenge actions that would fall within the three
recognized scenarios under Bowman and its progeny and also expands the ability of employees to seek relief beyond what has been

114. See Francis v. Nat’l Accrediting Comm’n of Career Arts & Scis., 293 Va. 167, 171–
72, 796 S.E.2d. 188, 190 (2017) (citing Johnston v. William E. Wood & Assocs., 292 Va. 222,
225–26, 787 S.E.2d 103, 105 (2016)).
115. 229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985).
116. Francis, 293 Va. at 172, 796 S.E.2d at 190 (citing Bowman, 229 Va. at 540, 331
S.E.2d at 801).
117. See id. at 172, 796 S.E.2d at 190.
118. See id. at 172–73, 796 S.E.2d at 190–91; see also Gerald v. Diversified Prot. Corp.,
No. 118:cv-1154, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106660, at *13 (E.D. Va. June 25, 2019) (reiterating
that under the second scenario, a wrongful termination claim under Bowman can only exist
if based on a public policy in a Virginia, not federal, statute or regulation); Briggman v.
Nexus Servs., No. 5:18-cv-00047, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209212, at *10 (W.D. Va. Dec. 11,
2018) (same).
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recognized by Bowman and its progeny. The new law provides that
“[a]n employer shall not discharge, discipline, threaten, discriminate against, or penalize an employee, or take other retaliatory action regarding an employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment”119 under the following
scenarios:
(1) The employee “[o]r a person acting on behalf of the employee, in good faith reports a violation of any federal or state
law or regulation to a supervisor or to any governmental body
or law-enforcement official;”120
(2) The employee “[i]s requested by a governmental body or
law-enforcement official to participate in an investigation,
hearing, or inquiry;”121
(3) The employee “[r]efuses to engage in a criminal act that
would subject him or her to criminal liability;”122
(4) The employee “[r]efuses to perform an action that violates
any federal or state law or regulation, and the employee informs the employer that the order is being refused for that reason;”123 or
(5) The employee “[p]rovides information to or testifies before
any governmental body or law-enforcement official conducting
an investigation, hearing, or inquiry into the alleged violation… .”124
The statute permits an aggrieved employee to file an action
against the employer seeking injunctive relief, reinstatement, and
an uncapped amount of lost wages, benefits, and reasonable attorney’s fees, but places a one-year statute of limitation on the employee’s right to do so.125

119. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-27.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
120. Id. § 40.1-27.3(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
121. Id. § 40.1-27.3(A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
122. Id. § 40.1-27.3(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
123. Id. § 40.1-27.3(A)(4) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
124. Id. § 40.1-27.3(A)(5) (Cum. Supp. 2020). However, the new whistleblower law provides no protection to an employee for (1) disclosures of data protected by law or a legal
privilege; (2) statements or disclosures that are knowingly false or in reckless disregard of
the truth; or (3) disclosures that would violate federal or state law or diminish the rights of
persons subject to protections of confidentiality in their communications. Id. § 40.127.3(B)(1)–(3) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
125. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-27.3(C) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
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4. Restrictive Covenants
The General Assembly also enacted a new law, Virginia Code
section 40.1-28.7:8, addressing covenants not to compete for certain low-wage employees, which also took effect on July 1, 2020. As
enacted, the new law provides: “No employer shall enter into, enforce, or threaten to enforce a covenant not to compete with any
low-wage employee.”126
The statute defines “covenant not to compete” as a covenant that
“restrains, prohibits, or otherwise restricts an individual’s ability,
following the termination of the individual’s employment, to compete with his former employer.”127 Importantly, it does not restrict
“an employee from providing a service to a customer or client of the
employer if the employee does not initiate contact with or solicit
the customer or client.”128
Certainly aware that covenants not to compete, as restraints on
trade, have generally been disfavored in Virginia,129 the General
Assembly did not enact a sweeping reform to restrictive covenants
for all workers. Instead, Virginia Code section 40.1-28.7:8 only applies to “low-wage employees.”130 Nevertheless, the statute broadly
defines “low-wage employee” to include all those employees whose
average weekly earnings are less than the average weekly wage of
the Commonwealth, as determined by Virginia Code section 65.2500 (Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act).131 The average weekly
wage of the Commonwealth, as reflected on the Virginia Workers’
Compensation Commission’s website, is $1137.00 effective July 1,
2020, which translates to $59,124.00 annually.132 In other words,
any employee making less than $1137.00 weekly or $59,124.00 annually cannot be bound by a non-compete.
It also expressly extends to “interns, students, apprentices or
trainees employed, with or without pay, at a trade or occupation in
order to gain work or educational experience” and independent

126. Id. § 40.1-28.7:8(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
127. Id. § 40.1-28.7:8(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
128. Id.
129. See Preferred Sys. Sols., Inc. v. GP Consulting, LLC, 284 Va. 382, 392, 732 S.E.2d
676, 681 (2012).
130. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.7:8 (Cum. Supp. 2020).
131. Id. § 40.1-7:8(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
132. Rates, VA. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION, http://www.workcomp.virginia.
gov/documents/rates-min-max-benefits-cola-mileage [https://perma.cc/D2T7-VLGU].
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contractors who earn “an hourly rate that is less than the median
hourly wage for the Commonwealth for all occupations.”133 It does
not apply, however, to employees whose earnings predominantly
come from sales commissions, incentives, and bonuses.134 Relatedly, the new law does not apply to nondisclosure agreements, and
employers are free to require nondisclosure agreements “intended
to prohibit the taking, misappropriating, threatening to misappropriate, or sharing of certain information, including trade secrets
. . . and proprietary or confidential information.”135
Virginia Code section 40.1-28.7:8 also provides two statutory enforcement mechanisms. First, it provides a private right of action
for affected employees to enjoin or void the covenant not to compete.136 If successful, a low-wage employee may recover (aside from
having the non-compete voided) payment of liquidated damages,
lost wages, damages, and reasonable attorney’s fees.137 The statute
attaches a two-year statute of limitations on this enforcement
mechanism beginning on the latter of (1) when the non-compete
was signed; (2) when the employee learned of the non-compete; (3)
when the employment ended; or (4) when the employer took steps
to enforce it.138
Second, the new law grants the Commissioner of the Virginia
Department of Labor and Industry the authority to assess a civil
penalty of $10,000 per violation to employers who violate the
law.139 Virginia Code section 40.1-28.7:8(G) also requires employers to post a summary of the law “in the same location where other
employee notices required by state or federal law are posted,” and
allows the Commissioner to assess civil penalties to violating employers ranging from a written warning for a first violation to
$1,000 for a third or subsequent violation.140

133. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-8(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
134. See id.
135. Id. § 40.1-28.7:8(C) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
136. Id. § 40.1-28.7:8(D) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
137. Id.
138. Id. Importantly, if an employer seeks to enforce a given non-compete and the court
finds in so doing that the non-compete at issue violated Virginia Code section 40.1-28.7:8,
the court may award the respondent employee attorneys’ fees, costs, and expert witness
fees. Id. § 40.1-28.7:8(F) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
139. Id. § 40.1-28.7:8(E) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
140. Id. § 40.1-28.7:8(G) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
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5. Minimum Wage Law
In conjunction with the new laws discussed above, the General
Assembly also passed House Bill 395/Senate Bill 7, which established an incremental minimum wage increase to $9.50 per hour
beginning on January 1, 2021 and up to $12.00 per hour on January 1, 2023 (with the potential to raise the minimum wage to
$15.00 on January 1, 2026, pending reenactment of the operative
positions).141 Unlike the aforementioned legislation which Governor Northam signed into law on April 12, 2020, Governor Northam
declined to sign the minimum wage increase into law but instead
proposed amendments for the General Assembly’s approval, including pushing back the effective date of the wage increase from
January 1, 2021 to May 1, 2021 to allow Virginia employers additional time to prepare in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.142 On
April 22, 2020, in a special (and eventful)143 veto session, the General Assembly narrowly passed Governor Northam’s amendments.144 The Virginia House of Delegates voted forty-nine to fortyfive in favor of Governor Northam’s amendments, while Lieutenant Governor Justin Fairfax broke the Senate’s twenty-to-twenty
vote tie in favor of the pushback.145 As a result, Virginia employers
must now prepare to compensate all hourly employees a minimum
of $9.50 per hour beginning May 1, 2021.146
As amended, Virginia Code section 40.1-28.10 provides for the
following minimum wage increases: (1) $9.50 per hour, effective
May 1, 2021; (2) $11.00 per hour, effective January 1, 2022; and (3)
$12.00 per hour, effective January 1, 2023.147 The new amendments also provide that the minimum wage will increase to $13.50
141. Act of Apr. 22, 2020, ch. 1204, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 40.1-28.10 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
142. Mel Leonor & Justin Mattingly, General Assembly Poised to Delay Minimum Wage
Increase During Reconvened Session, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Apr. 21, 2020), https://rich
mond.com/news/virginia/general-assembly-poised-to-delay-minimum-wage-increaseduring
-reconvened-session/article_598c5109-f53a-5f15-a825-b8cc95570f81.html [https://perma.cc/
ZK2S-XNZ3].
143. Justin Mattingly, Mel Leonor & Michael Martz, Lawmakers Back Northam on Key
Changes to Budget and Minimum Wage During a Veto Session Like No Other, RICH. TIMESDISPATCH (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/lawmakers-back-north
am-onkey-changes-to-budget-and-minimum-wage-during-a-veto-session/article_4eb03a05e4a5-5219-a8e5-0801c2413710.html [https://perma.cc/8YDH-7R5G].
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.10(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
147. Id. § 40.1-28.10(B)–(D) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
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on January 1, 2025, and $15.00 on January 1, 2026, contingent
upon the General Assembly’s enactment of those increases by July
1, 2024.148
In addition to the incremental wage increase, this new legislation also eliminates some historically recognized exemptions to the
state minimum law. For example, the new law removes minimum
wage exemptions for the following categories of workers: (1) individuals employed in domestic service or in a private home, such as
nannies; (2) individuals who normally work and are paid according
to the amount of work done or completed; (3) individuals whose
earning capacity is impaired by physical deficiency, mental illness,
or intellectual disability; and (4) individuals employed by businesses with less than four employees.149
Moreover, the new minimum wage law directs three state agencies—the Virginia Department of Housing and Community Development, the Virginia Economic Development Partnership Authority, and the Virginia Employment Commission—to conduct a joint
review of the feasibility of implementing a regional minimum wage
structure in the Commonwealth.150 These agencies must submit
their findings to the General Assembly and Governor by December
1, 2023.151
6. Virginia Wage Payment Laws
Aside from raising the minimum wage, the General Assembly
has also tackled the issue of wage payments on four additional
fronts.
First, in 2020, the General Assembly amended the Virginia
Wage Payment Act, Virginia Code section 40.1-29, to require employers to provide all employees with specific written paystubs.152
Second, in an amendment that took effect July 1, 2020, the General Assembly created a private right of action for employees to sue

148. Id. § 40.1-28.10(E)–(F) (Cum. Supp. 2020); Act of Apr. 22, 2020, ch. 1204, 2020 Va.
Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 40.1-28.9, -28.10).
149. Ch. 1204, 2020 Va. Acts at __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.9(A)
(Cum. Supp. 2020)).
150. Id. (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.10(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
151. Id.
152. Act of Apr. 10, 2020, ch. 1038, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 40.1-29(C) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
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their employers for unpaid wages.153 Prior to enacting this new
Wage Theft Law (House Bill 123/Senate Bill 838), the Virginia
Wage Payment Act required employers to pay salaried employees
once per month and hourly employees at least twice per month,
restricted unlawful deductions from wages, and required that terminated employees be paid for all work that was due to him or her
up until the time of termination.154 Nevertheless, under the previous statutory scheme, employees who were allegedly denied wages
had no private recourse in suit, but instead were required to file an
administrative claim with the Virginia Department of Labor and
Industry.155
Now, after the amendment, an aggrieved employee has a private
right of action to enforce his or her employer’s failure to pay wages
and need not rely on the discretion of the Commissioner to sue on
his or her behalf.156 The new law provides that this right of action
applies “without regard to any exhaustion of alternative administrative remedies.”157 Importantly, such an action can be brought
individually or as part of a collective action jointly with other aggrieved employees pursuant to the collective action procedures of
the Fair Labor Standards Act.158 The available remedies under this
newly created right of action are significant as well. If successful,
an aggrieved employee may recover “wages owed, an additional
equal amount as liquidated damages . . . and reasonable attorney
fees and costs.”159 Moreover, if the court determines that an employer “knowingly failed to pay wages,” the new right of action provides that “the court shall award the employee an amount equal to
triple the amount of wages due and reasonable attorney fees and
costs.”160 In addition, prejudgment interest is awarded at 8% under
the amendment, which exceeds Virginia’s 6% statutory pre-judgment interest scheme for other judgments.161
153. Id. (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-29(J) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
154. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-29(A), (C) (Repl. Vol. 2013).
155. See id. § 40.1-29(F) (Repl. Vol. 2013). In fact, Virginia courts have declined to read
a private right of action into the Virginia Wage Payment Act. See Pallone v. Marshall Legacy
Inst., 97 F. Supp. 2d 742, 745 (E.D. Va. 2000); Eslami v. Global One Commc’ns, Inc., 48 Va.
Cir. 17, 19 (1999) (Fairfax County).
156. See VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-29(J) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
157. Id.
158. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
159. Id.
160. Id. (emphasis added).
161. See id. § 40.1-29(G) (Cum. Supp. 2020). As was the case prior to the amendment,
the Virginia Wage Payment Act carries with it criminal penalties for an employer’s willful
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Third, in the same amendment, the General Assembly added
specific wage payment obligations for employers in the construction industry, making a general contractor and subcontractor
jointly liable for the payment of wages to the subcontractor’s employees.162 The operative provision reads:
Any construction contract entered into on or after July 1, 2020, shall
be deemed to include a provision under which the general contractor
and the subcontractor at any tier are jointly and severally liable to
pay any subcontractor’s employees at any tier the greater of (i) all
wages due to a subcontractor’s employees at such rate and upon such
terms as shall be provided in the employment agreement between the
subcontractor and its employees or (ii) the amount of wages that the
subcontractor is required to pay to its employees under the provisions
of applicable law, including the provisions of the Virginia Minimum
Wage Act (§ 40.1-28.8 et seq.) and the Fair Labor Standards Act (29
U.S.C. § 201 et seq.).163

In addition to the new statutory imposition of joint and several
liability, the General Assembly enacted a provision making the
general contractor “subject to all penalties, criminal and civil” that
would result from a subcontractor’s failure to pay all wages to the
subcontractor’s employee.164 However, the new law does include an
indemnification provision, requiring the subcontractor to “indemnify the general contractor for any wages, damages, interest, penalties, or attorney fees owed as a result of the subcontractor’s failure to pay wages to the subcontractor’s employees,” unless the
fault for the nonpayment lies with the general contractor.165 Liability also does not apply where the construction contract concerns
a single residential home or where the value of the project is less
than $500,000.166
Fourth, the General Assembly added a new section to the Virginia Wage Payment Act, Virginia Code section 40.1-29.1 (House
Bill 336/Senate Bill 49), that broadens the authority of the Virginia
Department of Labor and Industry to investigate an employer’s
and intentional defrauding or refusing to pay wages to an employee, absent a bona fide
dispute between the employer and the employee. Id. § 40.1-29(E) (Cum. Supp. 2020). If the
value of the unpaid wages is at least $10,000, the employer is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. If the value of the unpaid wages is less than $10,000, or if the employer is a repeat
offender, the employer is guilty of a Class 6 felony. Id.
162. Act of Apr. 10, 2020, ch. 1038, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 11-4.6 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
163. Id. at __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 11-4.6(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
164. Id. at __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 11-4.6(C) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
165. Id. at __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 11-4.6(D) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
166. Id. at __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 11-4.6(E) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
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failure or refusal to pay wages under the Virginia Wage Payment
Act.167 Specifically, Virginia Code section 40.1-29.1 provides that
the Commissioner has the authority to investigate whether an alleged failure or refusal to pay wages affected other employees besides the complainant if, in the course of the Commissioner’s investigation into an employee’s complaint of a wage payment violation,
there is “information creating a reasonable belief that other employees of the same employer may not have been paid” their full
wages.168 Under the new law, if such a violation is found, the Commissioner “may institute proceedings on behalf of any employee
against [the] employer.”169
7. Pay Transparency Law
Lastly, on April 22, 2020, the General Assembly passed a new
pay transparency law which prohibits employers from discharging
or otherwise retaliating against an employee for discussing wages
or compensation with another employee.170 The statute provides,
in pertinent part:
No employer shall discharge from employment or take other retaliatory action against an employee because the employee (i) inquired
about or discussed with, or disclosed to, another employee any information about either the employee’s own wages or other compensation
or about any other employee’s wages or other compensation or (ii) filed
a complaint with the Department alleging a violation of this section.171

Specifically excluded from this provision, however, are those
employees who have access to the compensation information of other
employees or applicants for employment as part of their essential job
functions who disclose the pay of other employees or applicants to individuals who do not otherwise have access to compensation information, unless the disclosure is (a) in response to a formal complaint
or charge, (b) in furtherance of an investigation, proceeding, hearing,
or action, including an investigation conducted by the employer, or (c)
consistent with a legal duty to furnish information.172

167. Acts of Mar. 10, 2020, chs. 205 & 206, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ & __, __ (codified at VA.
CODE ANN. § 40.1-29.1 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
168. Id. at __, __.
169. Id. at __, __.
170. Act of Apr. 22, 2020, ch. 1210, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 40.1-28.7:9 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
171. Id. at __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.7:9(A) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
172. Id. at __.
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The new law also vests authority in the Department of Labor
and Industry Commissioner to enforce the prohibition against discrimination and retaliation under this statute. Under the statute,
the Commissioner is required to notify a violating employer via
certified mail with a description of the alleged violation.173 Within
fifteen days of receiving the notice, the employer may request an
informal conference with the Commissioner.174 An employer who is
found in violation of this law is subject to a civil penalty of up to
$100 per violation.175 The new pay transparency law also took effect July 1, 2020.176
III. NOTABLE EMPLOYMENT LAW DECISIONS FROM THE
SUPREME COURT
While Virginia undoubtedly saw a sea change in terms of employment law in 2020, the Supreme Court of the United States decided two landmark cases within the last two years involving the
central antidiscrimination law in our county, affecting millions nationwide. In Bostock v. Clayton County, the Supreme Court interpreted Title VII to include a prohibition of discrimination in employment based on sexual orientation and gender identity.177 In
Fort Bend County v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that the requirement that an employee claiming discrimination file an administrative charge of discrimination prior to filing suit was not jurisdictional.178 A discussion on each of these cases follows.
A. Title VII Protects LGTBQ+ Employees (Bostock v. Clayton
County)
The landmark decision in Bostock v. Clayton County was actually a consolidated decision, being decided jointly with Altitude Express Inc. v. Zarda179 and R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc.
v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.180 In each case, an

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.7:9(B) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
Id. at __.
Id. at __.
Id. at __.
140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020).
139 S. Ct. 1843, 1851 (2019).
883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019).
884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019).
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employer terminated an employee who identified themselves as being homosexual or transgender. In the first instance, Gerald Bostock, a Child Welfare Services Coordinator, was terminated by his
employer, Clayton County, Georgia after participating in a gay
softball league.181 In Zarda, skydiving instructor Donald Zarda
was fired by his employer, Altitude Express, shortly after he mentioned he was gay.182 In Harris Funeral Homes, Aimee Stephens
was fired after she presented herself as a male but told her employer she planned to “live and work full-time as a woman.”183 In
Bostock, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Title VII, which by its plain language does not list
sexual orientation or gender identity in the list of protected classes,
does not prohibit employers from discharging an employee because
of his or her sexual orientation.184 In both Zarda and Harris Funeral Homes, the Second and Sixth Circuits respectively allowed
discrimination claims to proceed under Title VII.185
In a somewhat surprising six-three decision authored by President Trump’s first Supreme Court nominee, Justice Gorsuch, the
Supreme Court held that Title VII’s protections extend to employees identifying themselves as homosexual or transgender, calling
the ruling a “straightforward application of legal terms with plain
and settled meanings.”186
Of course, the majority acknowledged that the terms “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” do not appear in Title VII.187 In the
opinion, the majority certainly acknowledged that Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment because of an employee’s “race,
color, religion, sex, and national origin.”188 After a detailed review
of the terms “sex,” “because of,” and discrimination generally, Justice Gorsuch borrowed from the central observation in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,189 that an employee’s sex is “not relevant” to employment decisions and held that an employee’s “homosexuality or
181. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1843. Although many could foresee the Court’s ruling, few could have predicted the decision would be a six-three decision with two Justices considered to be conservative by most camps ruling in the employees’ favor.
187. Id. at 1746.
188. Id.
189. 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (plurality opinion).

HOLDSWORTH MASTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

11/30/2020 4:08 PM

EMPLOYMENT LAW

145

transgender status is not relevant to employment decisions.”190
Justice Gorsuch opined that this is because “[a]n employer violates
Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual employee based
in part on sex.”191
To elaborate on this principle, the Court observed that if a male
and female employee were both attracted to men, but the employer
only fired the man, this decision was based on sex.192 Similarly, if
there are two female employees but an employer fires only the female employee who was a male at birth, then the employer has
made this decision because of sex.193
The central arguments in Justice Alito’s and Justice Kavanaugh’s dissenting opinions194 concerned judicial lawmaking,
specifically the majority’s choice to read into Title VII protected
classes that are not clearly delineated in the words of the statute
itself.195 Citing to the many failed bills that have sought to add protections for the LGBTQ+ community over the forty-five-year history of Title VII, Justice Alito observed that the majority’s opinion
has taken the role of legislation on itself in order to interpret a
statute in a way that was unimaginable at the time of its inception.196 Although Justice Kavanaugh “acknowledge[d] the important victory achieved today by gay and lesbian Americans,” he
simultaneously expressed disappointment that the victory was
won by “judicial dictate” and not “through the democratic process.”197
Addressing the argument of legislative history, i.e., that the legislators who enacted the statute could not have foreseen this expansion of Title VII, the Bostock majority observed that a statute’s
legislative history has no bearing when the text of the statute is
clear and unambiguous.198 On this point, Justice Gorsuch opined
that “many, maybe most, applications of Title VII’s sex provision

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741.
Id.
Id. at 1741–42.
Id.
Justice Thomas joined Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion.
See id. at 1754–55 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 1822 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1754–55 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1836–37 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1749–50.
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were ‘unanticipated’ at the time of the law’s adoption,”199 which includes the Court’s decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,200 which found that same-sex harassment was prohibited by Title VII, even though it may not have been the “‘principal
evil’ legislators may have intended or expected to address” by enacting Title VII.201
In concluding, Justice Gorsuch powerfully opined:
Title VII’s effects have unfolded with far-reaching consequences,
some likely beyond what many in Congress or elsewhere expected. But
none of this helps decide today’s cases. Ours is a society of written
laws. Judges are not free to overlook plain statutory commands on the
strength of nothing more than suppositions about intentions or guesswork about expectations. In Title VII, Congress adopted broad language making it illegal for an employer to rely on an employee’s sex
when deciding to fire that employee. We do not hesitate to recognize
today a necessary consequence of that legislative choice: An employer
who fires an individual merely for being gay or transgender defies the
law.202

B. Exhaustion Remedy Not Jurisdictional (Fort Bend County v.
Davis)
In Fort Bend County v. Davis, the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split in resounding, unanimous fashion.203 The late Justice
Ginsburg authored the opinion that was issued a mere six weeks
after it was argued, holding that Title VII’s charge-filing requirement was not a jurisdictional requirement of the plaintiff, but was
instead a defense that could be theoretically waived by the defendant.204
In Davis, the respondent Lois M. Davis (“Davis”), was an information technology professional for Fort Bend County, Texas (“Fort
Bend”).205 In 2010, she complained to Fort Bend about sexual har-

199. Id. at 1752.
200. 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
201. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1749 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79); see id. at 1743–44 (discussing Oncale further).
202. Id. at 1754.
203. 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1845–46 (2019).
204. Id. at 1846.
205. Id. at 1847.
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assment by her director, which resulted in the director’s resignation.206 After the director’s resignation, however, Davis experienced retaliation by her supervisor, who was a friend of the director.207 Davis submitted an intake questionnaire and charge of
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).208 In the meantime, Davis was told to report to work
on a Sunday.209 Davis told her supervisor that she could not work
on Sunday due to a church commitment, but was told that if she
did not report to work, she would be terminated.210 On the Sunday
in question Davis went to church, did not report to work, and was
fired.211 Subsequently, Davis amended her EEOC intake questionnaire to include religious discrimination, but critically failed to
amend her formal EEOC charge to reflect religious discrimination.212
Davis sued Fort Bend County in 2012, alleging religious discrimination and retaliation for reporting sexual harassment.213 The
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
granted Fort Bend’s motion for summary judgment.214 Davis appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
which affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the retaliation
claim.215 However, the Fifth Circuit reversed summary judgment
as to the religious discrimination claim and remanded the case
back to the district court.216 Upon remand, Fort Bend asserted for
the first time that Davis’ failure to amend the formal EEOC charge
to reflect religious discrimination barred any relief for the religious
discrimination claim.217 The district court granted Fort Bend’s motion to dismiss, holding that the charge-filing requirement was jurisdictional and therefore that Davis had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to the religious discrimination claim.218
On appeal, however, the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that the
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1847–48.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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charge-filing requirement was not jurisdictional and that Fort
Bend had waived the right to raise the failure-to-exhaust-administrative-remedies defense by not raising it “until after ‘an entire
round of appeals all the way to the Supreme Court.’”219
Following the Fifth Circuit’s reversal, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve a divergence of authority in the federal circuit about Title VII’s charge-filing requirement.220 Affirming the Fifth Circuit’s ruling, Justice Ginsburg opined, “Title VII’s
charge-filing requirement is not of a jurisdictional cast.”221 She
drew a distinction between Title VII’s charge-filing requirement
and the statutory provisions through which federal courts can hear
Title VII’s cases: 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction)
and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (giving federal courts “jurisdiction
[over] actions brought under this subchapter”).222 The charge-filing
requirement, which is listed in multiple places in Title VII, “[does]
not speak to a court’s authority” or “refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts.”223 Instead, the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies is a procedural obligation, a “processing rule, albeit a mandatory one, [but] not a jurisdictional
prescription delineating the adjudicatory authority of courts.”224
The actual impact of Davis on Title VII litigation may not be
known for some years, as it is a rare case where an employer who
has a failure-to-exhaust-administrative-remedies defense would
not timely assert it.225 Nevertheless, Davis certainly provides employees with an added layer of procedural leniency in filing a
charge of discrimination and provides employers with another incentive to be scrupulous and observant in defending against Title
VII claims.226

219. Id. (quoting Davis v. Fort Bend Cty., 893 F.3d 300, 307–08 (5th Cir. 2018)).
220. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, for example, had
previously taken the position that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction when a
claimant fails to file a charge of discrimination based on a given characteristic with the
EEOC or similar state agency. See Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir.
2009).
221. Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 1849.
222. Id. at 1850–51 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(3)).
223. Id. (first quoting EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489, 512
(2014); and then quoting Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515 (2006)).
224. Id. at 1851.
225. See id. at 1847 (framing the issue around timeliness in raising defense).
226. See id. (describing defense as waived if not timely raised).
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CONCLUSION
The last two years, and particularly 2020, have seen the employment law landscape in Virginia shift towards increased protections
for employees and heightened obligations for employers. The
COVID-19 pandemic has further thrust employment law into the
spotlight, introducing a host of new issues for employees and employers alike to navigate. While the long-term effect of COVID-19
on Virginia’s economy is unknown, the General Assembly has
worked to bolster the rights of employees in the short term. As Virginians, like the rest of the world, grapple with the uncertainty
that 2020 has introduced, one thing remains certain: the workplace, as Virginians have known it, will never be the same.

